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Abstract 
 
Although researchers in business and management are becoming increasingly aware of the importance 
of endogeneity affecting regression analysis, they frequently do not have the right methodological 
toolkit to adjust for this issue. This paper discusses such a toolkit. There are also areas in business and 
management research which to date seem to be mostly oblivious about the endogeneity issue. This 
paper highlights such an area, which studies the question as to whether firms that are cross-listed on a 
foreign stock exchange are charged premium fees by their auditors. When the same methodology 
(pooled ordinary least squares) as in the existing literature is used, the existence of an audit fee 
premium for cross-listed firms seems to be confirmed. However, once methodologies are used which 
adjust for the various types of endogeneity (i.e. omitted variable bias, simultaneous and dynamic 
endogeneity) there is no longer support for the existence of such a generalised premium. Hence, this 
paper not only illustrates that failure to adjust for endogeneity has severe consequences such as 
drawing the wrong inferences, but it also reviews various ways to control for the different types of 
endogeneity. 
Keywords: endogeneity; omitted variable bias; panel data 
 
JEL codes: M00, C01, C18, C58 
 
*Corresponding author 
 2 
Introduction 
Endogeneity is a major methodological concern for many areas of business and management 
research that rely on regression analysis to draw causal inference. Roberts and Whited (2013, p.493) 
broadly define endogeneity as “a correlation between the explanatory variables and the error term in a 
regression”. Endogeneity may arise due to the omission of explanatory variables in the regression, 
which would result in the error term being correlated with the explanatory variables, thereby violating 
a basic assumption behind ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis. It may also be caused by 
the dependent variable being influenced by one or several explanatory variables, which in turn are 
influenced by the dependent variable. Such endogeneity may be of the simultaneous type whereby 
contemporaneous realisations of both the dependent variable and the explanatory variables in question 
affect each other. Or it may be of the dynamic type whereby past realisations of the dependent 
variable influence current realisations of one or more of the explanatory variables. For example, the 
current composition of a football team is likely to be – at least to some extent – the result of its past 
match performance. In particular, players who failed to play well in the past may no longer be part of 
the team and may have been replaced by new players who (are expected to) perform better. In other 
words, this is an example whereby past team or player performance (i.e. past realisations of the 
dependent variable) has an impact on current team composition (i.e. the current realisation of the 
explanatory variable(s)). Consequently, a study on the effect on performance of football team 
composition runs the risk of drawing the wrong inferences if it does not allow for dynamic effects.  
Endogeneity arises in empirical research in a broad range of business and management fields, 
including strategy, international business research, initial public offerings and venture capital, 
corporate diversification, corporate governance and accounting research. For example, Hamilton and 
Nickerson (2003) highlight the need for researchers to carefully consider endogeneity when 
investigating the impact of strategic decisions on subsequent organisational performance. As an 
example of this, Shaver (1998) examines whether the entry mode (acquisition or greenfield) into a 
market impacts the survival likelihood of foreign direct investments. The endogeneity concern arises 
here as performance may itself influence the entry mode. Indeed, in his subsequent empirical analysis, 
Shaver (1989) illustrates that his findings are very different once endogeneity is appropriately 
 3 
controlled for. Similarly, Reeb et al. (2012) highlight the importance of choosing a research approach 
that successfully tackles endogeneity concerns in the case of international business research. 
Consistent with this, in a study of the impact of the presence of foreign venture capitalists (VCs) on 
the likelihood of an international initial public offering (IPO) by entrepreneurial firms, Humphery-
Jenner and Suchard (2013) highlight the need to control for endogeneity arising from both the 
likelihood of foreign VCs investing in the firm due to the expectation of a subsequent international 
listing and the likelihood of foreign VCs investing in the firm due to its success and, as a result of this, 
being more likely to pursue an international IPO. The importance of correcting for endogeneity is also 
highlighted by Villalonga (2004) who finds that, after using econometric methods that correct for 
sample selection, corporate diversification does not destroy value, a finding at variance with prior 
research that has not utilised such controls. Further, in the case of corporate governance research, 
issues of endogeneity are especially pertinent. For example, Wintoki et al. (2012) argue that it is 
paramount that studies examining the impact of the structure of the board of directors on firm 
performance adjust for dynamic effects. Indeed, the current board structure is almost certainly a result 
of past firm performance and in turn is likely to impact on future firm performance. Another related 
example concerns the effect of managerial stock ownership on firm value. Himmelberg et al. (1999) 
argue that studies investigating the link between the two must allow for the possibility that current 
managerial stock ownership may have been affected by past firm performance. Finally, accounting 
research is another area which suffers from the lack of adjusting for endogeneity issues.  For example,  
Gow et al. (2010, p. 484) argue that “much of the empirical accounting literature uses panel data sets, 
typically repeated observations on the same, or a substantially overlapping, set of firms over time. In 
these data sets the variables of interest are often both cross-sectionally and serially correlated. As 
such, the common assumption of independence in regression errors is generally violated. While it is 
well known that residual dependence can result in misspecified test statistics (Bernard, 1987), prior 
methodological work in the accounting literature focuses exclusively on cross-sectional dependence 
and does not examine the issues created by the presence of both cross-sectional and time-series 
dependence.” 
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While the above examples we use to illustrate the consequences from the failure to adjust for 
endogeneity relate to fairly narrow research questions, this does not imply that this type of failure is 
limited to a few isolated areas in business and management research. Indeed, a 2012 editorial in the 
Journal of International Business Studies (Reeb et al., 2012) highlights the prevalence of endogeneity 
issues in international business (IB) research, but also points out that many researchers fail to address 
these issues in their research. The editors write that “in IB studies that do not take into account the 
[endogeneity] problem, we routinely observe that JIBS reviewers recommend rejection” (Reeb et al., 
2012, p.212). The fact that this editorial has been written as recently as 2012, by the editors of a top 
business and management journal, suggests that researchers are still in need of increased awareness of 
endogeneity and guidance on how to address this important methodological issue. Moreover, in 
relation to leadership studies Antonakis et al. (2014, p.93) stress that “… most researchers in 
leadership studies (and management in general) ignore one key design and estimation problem 
rendering parameter estimates uninterpretable: endogeneity”. Furthermore, Antonakis et al. (2010) 
review the methodological rigour with which causal claims are being made in a sample of 110 articles 
on leadership published in top tier journals. They find that “… researchers fail to address at least 66% 
and up to 90% of design and estimation conditions that make causal claims invalid” (p.1086). In 
addition, Semadeni et al. (2013, p.1071) state that their review of articles in the Strategic Management 
Journal between 2005 and 2010 “reveals alarming inconsistencies regarding how strategy researchers 
approach and remedy endogeneity”.  Similarly, Wintoki et al. (2012,p.581) write that: “[e]mpirical 
corporate finance research, which attempts to explain the causes and effects of financial decisions, 
often has serious issues with endogeneity […] [T]he implications for the empirical work’s usefulness 
if it does not properly deal with endogeneity can be substantial.” This broad methodological issue 
gives rise to a need for a road map providing guidelines to researchers about how to correct for 
endogeneity once the issue has been identified. We provide such guidance throughout the paper, 
including a road map towards the end of the paper.  
In what follows, we apply an estimation technique to a particular research question which 
adjusts for the three types of endogeneity (i.e. omitted variable bias, simultaneous endogeneity, and 
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dynamic endogeneity). It is important to note that simultaneous endogeneity can be addressed by 
estimating a system of equations, i.e. 2-stage (2SLS) or 3-stage least squares (3SLS) regression. 
However, such a system requires as many external exogenous instruments as there are equations. A 
practical difficulty that arises is that it may be very difficult to find such instruments. The estimation 
techniques we review and illustrate in this paper do not suffer from that difficulty. With the help of a 
concrete example, we show how failure to correct for endogeneity may have led to the wrong causal 
inferences. The example we use is that of UK firms that are cross-listed in the USA. A cross-listed 
firm is a firm, which in addition to its domestic stock exchange listing, is listed on a foreign exchange. 
The existing literature suggests that UK firms that are cross-listed in the USA are charged a premium 
on their audit fees, possibly reflecting the greater risk of litigation in the USA. However, when the 
econometric estimation procedure allows for endogeneity the results obtained from the existing 
literature are no longer upheld. More precisely, we find that, when allowing for endogeneity, our 
results fail to corroborate those from the existing literature as to the existence of a cross-listing 
premium. 
Our study makes three important contributions to the broader business and management 
literature. First, it highlights the severity of the biases that may result when one fails to adjust for 
endogeneity. As our example suggests, failure to adjust for endogeneity can have major consequences 
and result in the researcher drawing the wrong inferences. Second, it applies a well-known estimator 
to a new empirical problem and shows that the results may differ depending on the assumptions made 
(the ones required to define the correct estimator). This estimator corrects for the three types of 
endogeneity, i.e. omitted variable bias and dynamic and simultaneous endogeneity. Contrary to e.g. 
2SLS and 3SLS, the estimator we apply does not rely on additional, external sets of instruments that 
may be difficult to come by. Finally and as mentioned above, we also provide a road map for 
researchers on how to deal with these methodological issues. 
Literature Review – Audit Pricing and Cross-listing 
An important factor in audit pricing models is perceived client risk, with greater client risk 
implying higher audit fees (Cobbin, 2002; Hay et al., 2006). The rationale for this is that riskier audits 
 6 
increase the likelihood that the auditors will be subject to liability claims which may result in both 
financial and reputational costs to auditors. Auditors are expected to react to greater risk by increasing 
the effort they put into the audit and/or by adding an insurance premium to the audit fee (Simunic and 
Stein, 1996). However, as most audit pricing studies are based on a single country and the risk of 
litigation is therefore virtually the same across firms, assessing the impact of liability risk on audit 
fees is difficult. One way of overcoming this difficulty is to investigate companies that are subject to 
more than one legal jurisdiction. This is the case for companies that are cross-listed on a foreign stock 
exchange. In particular, as the USA is thought to have a more litigious environment than the UK, a 
cross-listing on a US stock exchange is likely to increase liability exposure for auditors (Seetharaman 
et al., 2002). Hence, companies cross-listed in the USA are likely to be charged a premium on their 
audit fees.  
The level of the audit fee is also likely to be related to the type of cross-listing. Unless it is 
Canadian or Israeli, a foreign company can only cross-list indirectly, i.e. via American Depositary 
Receipts (ADRs), on a US exchange. These ADRs are issued by an American bank and each represents a 
fraction or a multiple of one unit of the foreign stock (Ayyagari, 2004). A US cross-listing comes in three 
different types: a listing on a US exchange, i.e. NYSE, Nasdaq or Amex, a listing on the over-the-counter 
market (OTC) and a listing on PORTAL. An exchange listed firm may consist of a Level III ADR or a 
Level II ADR. The former requires full compliance with US GAAP and enables the firm to issue capital 
on a US exchange. The latter only requires partial compliance with US disclosure and accounting rules. 
Both Level II and Level III ADRs require the company to file with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) the last three years of its financial accounts, audited according to US audit standards 
(Abdallah, 2008). If there is a cross-listing premium on audits, exchange-listed firms are likely to be those 
subject to such a premium. In contrast, a Level I ADR, which is listed and traded on OTC, does not 
require the company to comply with US GAAP and all of the SEC disclosure requirements. Finally, a 
Rule 144a private offering consists of a listing on PORTAL, an electronic market, which is not regulated 
by the SEC and only open to so called qualified institutional buyers (QIBs) for trading. 
 Although studies that investigate the evidence of a US cross-listing premium for audits are as 
yet sparse, they tend to agree that such a premium exists (Seetharaman et al., 2002; Choi et al., 2009). 
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More recently, research has been focusing on the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) on audit 
pricing in the USA. Several studies (see e.g., Ghosh and Pawlewicz, 2007; Griffin and Lont, 2007; 
Eldridge and Kealey, 2005; Charles et al., 2010; Iliev, 2010) report significant increases in audit fees after 
Sarbanes-Oxley. This suggests that Sarbanes-Oxley may also have increased audit fees for companies 
with a US cross-listing. 
Correcting for Endogeneity 
 The existing literature, such as Seetharaman et al. (2002), typically analyses a cross-section 
repeated over a number of years. However, instead of treating the data as a panel of data, the sample 
is pooled across the years and then used to estimate ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. This 
pooling of the data is not as innocuous as it seems at first sight. Indeed, it is based on the assumptions 
that 1) there are no omitted variables and 2) there is no dynamic and simultaneous endogeneity. Both 
assumptions seem highly unrealistic. The first assumption is unrealistic as one of the key factors 
determining audit fees is the risk of the audit as perceived by the auditors. As this risk is perceived 
and cannot be directly measured, researchers have used a variety of proxies. Hence, it is possible that 
the proxies are of poor quality and/or exclude important aspects of risk. In other words, given the way 
audits are priced it is highly likely that any model of audit pricing suffers from omitted variables. The 
second assumption is also unrealistic for at least three reasons. First, it is likely that the decision to 
remain cross-listed depends on the current and past costs of the cross-listing, including the (potential) 
cross-listing premium for the audit. SOX may have increased this premium. Indeed, following 
Sarbanes-Oxley there were cases of UK firms that cancelled their US cross-listing given the increase 
in compliance costs.1 Second, it could be the case that some firms may have historically been charged 
higher audit fees, maybe because of their greater complexity and/or lower bargaining power vis-à-vis 
the auditors. While audit pricing models include some measures of complexity and bargaining power, 
clearly such measures are proxies as complexity and bargaining power cannot be directly observed. 
Moreover, auditors are highly likely to use the past year’s audit fees as a reference point when 
negotiating the audit fees for the coming year. This would suggest that there might be dynamic 
effects, calling for the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable on the right hand side. Third, to 
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confirm the assumption of stationarity, we perform a unit root test specifically designed for 
unbalanced panel data (Maddala and Wu, 1999). The null that there is a unit root is rejected at the 1% 
confidence level (p-value= 0.0001).2 Hence, there is no evidence of a unit root or non-stationarity in 
audit fees. In other words, there is evidence that audit fees are stationary or persistent over time. This 
suggests that there may be dynamic effects. Given the latter, it makes sense to include the lagged level 
of the dependent variable on the right hand side of the regression: 
TtNiavfbxayy itiittiit ...,,3,2;...,,1;1 where1, ==<+++= −   (1) 
ity  is the audit fees paid by firm i for period t; 1, −tiy  is audit fees for the preceding year; itx  is a set 
of observable firm, audit and auditor characteristics as suggested by audit pricing models; if  is an 
unobserved time-invariant characteristic of that firm and itv  is an error term,
3 which is not serially 
correlated. The number of firms N is assumed to be large and the number of periods T is fairly small. 
In the empirical analysis that follows, we check the statistical significance of the coefficient a. If the 
coefficient proves to be statistically significant, then dynamic effects will be important.  
If if  is correlated with itx , then the OLS estimator will not be a consistent estimate of b (i.e. the 
bias is not reduced with a larger sample size). This is the OLS omitted variable inconsistency or OLS 
omitted variable bias (Wooldridge, 2002; Verbeek, 2012). In addition, the OLS estimator of a will 
be upward biased and inconsistent as 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 is correlated with if  (see e.g. Bond, 2002). This is the 
dynamic endogeneity issue. The Within Groups or fixed-effects estimation technique deals with the 
former issue by taking for each variable the deviation of each observation from the variable’s time 
mean. As if  is time-invariant, it is hence eliminated. Still, as the number of periods T is small, the 
Within Groups estimator of a is also biased, but in the opposite direction. This bias stems from the 
correlation between the transformed lagged dependent variable and the transformed error term. 
Similar to OLS, the Within Groups estimator is inconsistent as this bias does not disappear as N 
increases. 
 Blundell and Bond (1998) suggest the Generalized Method of Moments as a system (System 
GMM) which corrects for all three types of endogeneity. However in contrast to 2SLS and 3SLS, it 
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does not rely on external exogenous instruments, which in practice may be difficult to identify 
(Wintoki et al., 2012). It consists of a system of two sets of equations, each with its own internal 
instruments. The first set of equations is in levels and is therefore still subject to omitted variable bias; 
just like an OLS regression. However, by assuming that these omitted variables are time invariant, 
which is likely a reasonable assumption for a short period of time (i.e. T is small), the lagged 
differences of the dependent variable and the independent variables can then be used as instruments 
for the first set. The second set consists of the equations in first differences with the lagged levels of 
the dependent variable and the independent variables as instruments. The validity of the instruments 
can be confirmed via a Sargan (1958) test and Hansen (1982) J test. The Sargan test checks for over-
identifying restrictions and it is asymptotically distributed as a χ2(n) with n degrees of freedom under 
the null hypothesis of valid instruments. It is not robust to heterogeneity and autocorrelation. While 
the Hansen test is robust to these, in turn it tends to perform poorly in the presence of a large number 
of instruments. Finally, we use the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation to test for first-order 
correlation (m1) and second-order correlation (m2) in the residuals. While first-order correlation is not 
an issue (given that the equations are in first differences, second-order serial correlation would be. 
Data Sources, Sample Selection and Methodology 
Our period of study is 1999 to 2008, which includes the passing of SOX in 2002. Our sample 
consists of the 137 cross-listed UK firms with complete data that we could identify via stock 
exchange websites and direct correspondence with the Bank of New York, the depository bank with 
the largest market share (i.e. 64%) in the ADR market.4 Eighty-three of these firms are cross-listed on 
a US exchange (NYSE, Nasdaq, Amex), 53 on the OTC and one on PORTAL. We then build a 
control sample of non-cross-listed firms. These are matched with the cross-listed firms by industry 
(Datastream Industrial Classification) and with the closest size (as measured by total assets in 2000). 
We match the cross-listed firms not only by industry, but also by size as cross-listed firms tend to be 
the largest firms in their industry. We are able to perform this matching for 128 of the sample firms. 
Table A in the Appendix reports the definitions and sources for the variables we use.  
We include the following variables, which prior research has identified as being influential in the 
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determination of audit fees: firm size as measured by the natural logarithm of total assets (Hay et al., 
2006), audit complexity and risk as measured by the total number of subsidiaries, the number of non-
UK subsidiaries, the number of US subsidiaries (O’Sullivan, 2000; McMeeking et al., 2006, 2007), 
account receivables and also inventories, both expressed as a proportion of total assets, as well as 
return on assets and return on equity to proxy firm performance (Hay et al., 2006). We also include debt 
as a proportion of total assets to measure leverage (Choi et al., 2008; Zaman et al., 2011). Finally, we 
also control for the characteristics of the auditors by including binary variables indicating whether the 
audit was undertaken by one of the large audit firms5 (McMeeking et al., 2006, 2007; Zaman et al., 2011) 
and whether the auditors are based in London (O’Sullivan, 2000).  
Data Analysis 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms. The 
table pools firm-year observations across the period of study of 1999 to 2008. While cross-listed firms 
pay higher audit fees, they are also larger and have greater leverage. In contrast, there are no 
differences in terms of the importance of inventories and receivables between cross-listed firms and 
non-cross-listed firms. Cross-listed firms also have much less volatile profitability as evidenced by the 
lower standard deviations for the return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA). Although the 
means for ROE and ROA give a mixed message, the medians suggest that the cross-listed firms are 
more profitable. Cross-listed firms also tend to be more complex organisations as reflected by the 
greater number of subsidiaries. Finally, cross-listed firms are more likely to have an auditor from the 
Big Four or Big Five auditing firms.6 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Table 2 shows the results from the pooled OLS regressions. The regressions are similar to 
those estimated by Seetharaman et al. (2002). Each regression in the table contains the same control 
variables, except for the performance measure (which is ROA in regressions (1), (3) and (5) and ROE 
in the remaining ones) and the cross-listing indicator variables. In terms of the latter, the first two 
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regressions include an indicator variable which equals one if the firm is cross-listed, and zero 
otherwise. This indicator variable tests for the presence of an audit premium affecting all cross-listed 
firms. The next two regressions include two indicator variables: the first one indicates whether the 
firm is exchange-listed whereas the second one indicates whether the firm is OTC-listed. These two 
indicator variables allow for a differential audit premium across the two types of host markets for the 
cross-listing. The final two regressions include an indicator variable accounting for a possible post-
SOX effect for the exchange-listed firms and a post-SOX effect for the OTC-listed firms, 
respectively. 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE  
Except for ROE, the results for the control variables reflect those from other studies. There is 
strong evidence (at the 1% significance level) that UK firms with a US cross-listing pay premium 
audit fees (see regressions (1) and (2)) and that the premium is greater for exchange-listed firms 
compared to OTC-listed firms. Hence, our pooled OLS regressions seem to confirm the existence of a 
cross-listing premium and the premium is greater the greater the exposure of the cross-listed firm to 
US legislation and hence litigation. Nevertheless, these results need to be interpreted with caution as 
the pooled OLS regressions do not adjust for possible omitted variable bias and simultaneous or 
dynamic endogeneity.  
Table 3 shows how the various estimation techniques – OLS in levels (regressions (1) to (4)), 
Within Groups (regressions (5) to (8)) and System GMM (regressions (9) to (12)) – perform in terms 
of addressing these two issues. All of the regressions in Table 3 are identical to those of Table 2, 
except for the fact that the data are no longer pooled and that the lagged dependent variable is now 
included on the right hand side. In other words, the models are dynamic panel regressions rather than 
static regressions. The first OLS in levels regression confirms the existence of a cross-listing 
premium. However, contrary to Table 2, this premium is only observed for exchange-listed firms and 
no longer for OTC-listed firms (see regression (2)). Also, this cross-listing premium can only be 
observed for exchange-listed firms after SOX was passed (see regressions (3) and (4)). This result is 
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already in stark contrast with the existing literature which finds evidence of a pre-SOX cross-listing 
premium.  
When the Within Groups estimator is used, there is no longer evidence of a cross-listing 
premium whatever the type of cross-listing (see regressions (5) and (6)). However, similar to OLS in 
levels, there is evidence of a cross-listing premium for exchange-listed firms post-SOX. As expected, 
the value of the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is much smaller (0.49-0.52) for the 
Within Groups regressions than for the OLS in levels regressions (0.74). The large difference between 
the two values reflects the likely upward bias of the OLS in levels estimator and the likely downward 
bias of the Within Groups estimator. This indicates that there is endogeneity. Further, the System 
GMM regressions confirm the results from the Within Groups regressions as to the absence of a 
generalised cross-listing premium (see regressions (9) and (10)). However, although significance 
levels have now dropped from 1% to 10%, there is still evidence of a post-SOX cross-listing premium 
for the exchange-listed firms (see regressions (11) and (12)). The significant coefficient on the lagged 
dependent variable in the GMM regressions confirms the presence of dynamic effects, and neglecting 
such effects would cause dynamic endogeneity. 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
This case study suggests that failure to adjust for omitted variable bias and simultaneous or dynamic 
endogeneity can lead to the wrong inferences. We have applied an estimation technique which adjusts 
for both. In what follows we provide a road map for the use of the econometric techniques that 
addresses endogeneity in panel data arising from omitted variable bias, simultaneous and dynamic 
endogeneity. 
Guidance for empirical researchers 
If the researcher suspects endogeneity, the first step would be to determine the source of it. If 
it is likely to arise because of omitted variables then the Within Groups estimator can mitigate the 
ensuing bias. However, the Within Groups estimator will only produce consistent parameters if the 
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independent variables are strongly exogenous, i.e. past realisations of the dependent variable are 
uncorrelated with current values of the independent variable(s) (Wintoki et al., 2012). If the 
assumption of exogeneity of the independent variables is violated, then Within Groups is not an 
adequate estimation technique to address the endogeneity. In addition, Flannery and Hankins (2013) 
find that Within Groups performs poorly for short panels and is sensitive to high persistence in the 
data (i.e. coefficient a in equation (1) would be close to 1). 
If simultaneity is the likely cause of endogeneity (i.e. the current observations of the 
dependent variable affect the current observations of one or more of the independent variables and 
vice versa), then the OLS and Within Groups estimators will be biased. A comparison of the OLS 
estimator of the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable with the equivalent Within Groups 
estimator will act as a diagnostic test of endogeneity. If both estimators are very different, then 
endogeneity is likely an issue. One solution to the problem is to use a system of equations 
(2SLS/3SLS). However, using this estimation technique requires the use of external exogenous 
variables which in many cases are difficult to find.  
Therefore, given the strict exogeneity assumptions of Within Groups and the need for finding 
external instruments in an instrumental variable system, the researcher may have to rely on a dynamic 
system GMM regression which produces consistent and efficient parameters that are robust to the 
biases and inconsistencies caused by omitted variables, simultaneity and dynamic endogeneity. To 
test the assumption of exogeneity of the lagged independent variables the researcher may use the test 
of second-order serial correlation. Two other tests are the Sargan and the Hansen tests which both test 
for over-identification of the instruments. While for most settings, one chooses a significance level of 
10%, for the Sargan and Hansen tests the cut-offs used under System GMM are typically 5%. In other 
words, with certain data sets if one were to choose a significance level of 10% it would be virtually 
impossible to find sets of valid instruments. A way forward would be to use e.g. instruments dated t-4 
instead of e.g. instruments dated t-2 or t-3. However, this may not be ideal as such instruments may be 
too weakly correlated with the dependent and independent variables measured in t. 
The researcher should also determine how many lags of the dependent variable should be 
used. Wintoki et al. (2012) argue that this is important to ensure dynamic completeness. If full 
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information from the past that affects the present is not incorporated then we still have endogeneity. 
Also, as the earlier lags are exogenous to current residuals, they can be used as instruments. One way 
to check how many lags of the dependent variable to include is to regress the dependent variable on 
several of its lags. The cut off for the lags is determined when a particular lag of the dependent 
variable becomes insignificant. For instance, if the researcher includes four lags of the dependent 
variable in the regression model, and after the estimation of the model the first two lags are significant 
whereas the last two are not, then the first two lags of the dependent variable are appropriate in this 
case. 
By using System GMM one controls for omitted variable bias. System GMM should be used 
over a short period of time as the equations in levels still suffer from omitted variable bias and to deal 
with this one assumes that the correlation between the independent variables and the omitted 
variable(s) is constant over time which is a reasonable assumption over a short period of time 
(Wintoki et al., 2012). 
Conclusion 
 Although endogeneity is not a new issue in business and management research, a recent editorial 
in the Journal of International Business Studies (Reeb et al., 2012) suggests that many researchers are 
either unaware of the issue or do not know how to address it. With the help of a concrete example, this 
paper has illustrated that failure to adjust for omitted variable bias and dynamic endogeneity may have 
severe consequences as it may lead to the wrong inferences being made. A caveat applies. We do not 
claim here that System GMM is the only valid methodology to adjust for endogeneity and, certainly, it 
only applies to the context of panel data. In fact, the results we obtained from the Within Groups 
estimations were fairly similar to those obtained from the System GMM estimations. Both sets of results 
rejected the presence of a generalised audit premium as suggested by the OLS regressions. What is 
important to realise is that, in the example we used, the omitted variable bias was clearly the most severe 
of all three types of endogeneity. As the Within Groups estimator eliminates the unobserved firm 
characteristic (which is assumed not to vary across time) by taking the deviation of each observation 
from its time mean, it does not suffer from omitted variable bias as the OLS estimator does. However, 
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this radical way of dealing with omitted variable bias in turn may cause problems. Indeed, the 
estimate obtained from Within Groups for the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is much 
smaller (it ranges from 0.493 to 0.524) than that obtained from OLS (it ranges from 0.739 to 0.744) 
and that obtained from System GMM (which ranges from 0.659 to 0.694). In other words, the 
downward bias the Within Groups estimator suffers from is much more pronounced than the upward 
bias the OLS estimator suffers from, assuming the System GMM estimator is closest to the true value 
of the coefficient. If obtaining a precise estimate of the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable 
were important (as this would be the case for e.g. studies on the persistence of profitability) System 
GMM would nevertheless have been the preferred option. 
 In turn, System GMM relies on instruments that are in the form of lagged levels of the 
dependent and the independent variables (for the equations in first differences) and lagged differences 
(for the equations in levels). This way of dealing with omitted variable bias and simultaneous or 
dynamic endogeneity may be less radical than the way adopted by Within Groups. Nevertheless, it 
relies on a sufficiently long time series. Also, one of the advantages of System GMM, compared to 
Within Groups, is that it allows for the inclusion of time invariant binary variables whereas these are 
effectively differenced away under the latter. Another issue that the researcher intent on using System 
GMM faces is to determine the number of lags used in the instrument set. In practice, the Sargan and 
Hansen tests can be very helpful in terms of determining the set of instruments. However, the 
researcher may encounter cases where there is a need to balance the requirement for a set of valid 
instruments with a model that still has explanatory power.  
 In summary, the issues discussed in this paper should help inform future business and 
management research in two respects. First, by highlighting and illustrating the importance of 
endogeneity business and management researchers should be more aware of both the need to consider 
it in their research design, analysis and in the interpretation of their empirical findings. Second, the 
case study presented here provides some insights into how endogeneity may be controlled for in 
empirical analysis. 
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1 For example, the following extract from the 2005 annual report of Provalis plc captures the likely impact of compliance 
costs on a UK company’s cross-listing decision: 
During the year [2005] it was decided to terminate the Group's ADR programme in the USA and to de-list from NASDAQ 
thus reducing compliance costs significantly, freeing management time and avoiding unnecessary and onerous 
commitments.  
Source: 2005 annual report of Provalis plc, p.2. 
2 The null is also rejected when we allow for a trend or a drift and when the Phillips-Perron test rather than the Augmented 
Dickey Fuller test is used.  
3 We assume that the error terms are independently and identically distributed across firms. 
4 See http://www.adrbnymellon.com/dr_why.jsp?paramUserType=issuers, consulted on 4 April 2013 
5 Between 1999 and 2002 the large audit firms were Arthur Andersen, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers. After the demise of Arthur Andersen in 2002 most of its UK audit business merged with Deloitte 
& Touche. 
6 For 2002-2008, Big Four is set to one if the auditor is one of the Big Four auditors and zero otherwise. Similarly, Big Five 
is set to one during the 1999-2001 for firm-year observations with a Big Five auditor, and zero otherwise. See also Table 
A. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for non-cross-listed firms and cross-listed firms 
 
The data reported are for the 137 cross-listed firms in the US and the 128 industry-and-size matched non-cross-listed firms. 
The data are pooled across the years 1999 to 2008. Not all firms have data for all the years. N is the number of firm-year 
observations.  
 Cross-listed firms Non-cross-listed firms 
Variable Mean Median Std Dev (N) Mean Median Std Dev (N) 
Audit fee (£’000) 2,593 1,100 4,588 
(1,139) 
648 300 1,432 
(1,153) 
Non-audit fee paid to auditor 
(£’000) 
3,252 1,400 5,405 
(1,138) 
748 253 1,703 
(1,150) 
Non-audit fee paid to others 
(£’000) 
916 0 11,321 
(1,119) 
66 0 564 
(1,129) 
Ln(Total assets) (£’000) 14.56 15.04 2.81 
(1,158) 
13.04 13.11 2.34 
(1,218) 
Total inventories / Total 
assets 
0.07 0.04 0.09 
(1,051) 
0.07 0.03 0.09 
(1,112) 
Receivables / Total assets 0.14 0.11 0.11 
(1,051) 
0.16 0.13 0.14 
(1,111) 
Debt / Total assets 0.28 0.24 0.35 
(1,157) 
0.19 0.16 0.18 
(1,218) 
Return on assets (%) -3.77 5.66 54.93 
(1,150) 
-2.58 4.10 69.76 
(1,209) 
Return on equity (%) -7.90 11.64 227.96 
(1,042) 
-19.13 8.11 299.63 
(1,156) 
Number of subsidiaries 28.02 18 31.91 
(1,136) 
19.79 11 21.4 
(1,153) 
Number of non-UK 
subsidiaries 
18.44 8 27.51 
(1,136) 
10.34 5 15.94 
(1,153) 
Number of US subsidiaries 3.5 2 4.83 
(1,136) 
2.29 0 4.6 
(1,153) 
Big Five 0.32 0 0.47 
(1,152) 
0.24 0 0.43 
(1,149) 
Big Four 0.61 1 0.49 
(1,152) 
0.57 1 0.5 
(1,153) 
London Based Auditor 0.69 1 0.46 
(1,298) 
0.51 1 0.5 
(1,260) 
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Table 2: Pooled OLS regressions 
The dependent variable in all models is the natural logarithm of audit fees. The models are estimated using OLS. All models 
include industry dummies. All models include time dummies, except for models (5) and (6). The values in parentheses are the 
p-values. The standard errors are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.  
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ln(Total assets) 0.508 
(0.000) 
0.499 
(0.000) 
0.506 
(0.000) 
0.496 
(0.000) 
0.505 
(0.000) 
0.495 
(0.000) 
Inventories/Total assets 1.141 
(0.002) 
1.335 
(0.000) 
1.125 
(0.002) 
1.320 
(0.001) 
1.077 
(0.002) 
1.231 
(0.001) 
Receivables/Total assets 1.318 
(0.000) 
1.145 
(0.000) 
1.321 
(0.000) 
1.148 
(0.000) 
1.314 
(0.000) 
1.131 
(0.000) 
Proportion of non-UK 
subs. 
0.500 
(0.000) 
0.506 
(0.000) 
0.498 
(0.000) 
0.501 
(0.000) 
0.512 
(0.000) 
0.507 
(0.000) 
Proportion of US subs. 0.892 
(0.000) 
0.838 
(0.000) 
0.888 
(0.000) 
0.827 
(0.000) 
0.988 
(0.000) 
0.934 
(0.000) 
Debt/Total assets 0.189 
(0.001) 
0.204 
(0.029) 
0.188 
(0.001) 
0.199 
(0.039) 
0.228 
(0.000) 
0.236 
(0.012) 
ROA -0.002 
(0.000) 
─ -0.002 
(0.000) 
─ -0.002 
(0.000) 
─ 
ROE ─ 0.000 
(0.009) 
─ 0.000 
(0.009) 
─ 0.000 
(0.002) 
Big Four 0.163 
(0.083) 
0.168 
(0.080) 
0.164 
(0.081) 
0.170 
(0.076) 
0.196 
(0.036) 
0.203 
(0.030) 
Big Five -0.03 
(0.776) 
-0.036 
(0.725) 
-0.03 
(0.779) 
-0.034 
(0.742) 
0.007 
(0.950) 
0.000 
(0.999) 
London 0.325 
(0.000) 
0.301 
(0.000) 
0.325 
(0.000) 
0.299 
(0.000) 
0.360 
(0.000) 
0.334 
(0.000) 
Ln(Non-audit fee to 
auditor) 
0.131 
(0.000) 
0.132 
(0.000) 
0.13 
(0.000) 
0.130 
(0.000) 
0.134 
(0.000) 
0.136 
(0.000) 
Ln(Non-audit fee to other) 0.024 
(0.129) 
0.026 
(0.126) 
0.024 
(0.138) 
0.025 
(0.137) 
0.025 
(0.134) 
0.027 
(0.130) 
Cross-listed 0.215 
(0.000) 
0.207 
(0.000) 
─ ─ ─ ─ 
Exchange-listed ─ ─ 0.247 
(0.001) 
0.258 
(0.001) 
─ ─ 
OTC-listed ─ ─ 0.185 
(0.007) 
0.162 
(0.021) 
─ ─ 
Post-SOX effect for 
exchange-listed firms 
─ ─ ─ ─ 0.320 
(0.000) 
0.340 
(0.000) 
Post-SOX effect for OTC-
listed firms 
─ ─ ─ ─ 0.024 
(0.728) 
0.028 
(0.693) 
Constant -2.383 
(0.000) 
-2.164 
(0.000) 
-2.375 
(0.000) 
-2.119 
(0.000) 
-2.383 
(0.000) 
-2.008 
(0.000) 
R-squared 0.910 0.909 0.910 0.909 0.910 0.909 
No. of observations 1901 1768 1901 1768 1896 1763 
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Table 3: Dynamic panel data models with dummies for US cross-listing 
The dependent variable in all models is the natural logarithm of audit fees. The regressions are run on the whole sample of firm-year observations. The values in parentheses are the p-values. m1 
and m2 are tests for the absence of first-order and second-order serial correlation in the residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The Sargan statistic is a 
test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2(k) with k degrees of freedom under the null of valid instruments. While the Sargan statistic is not robust to heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation, it is not weakened by many instruments. Hence, the Hansen test which is robust, but weakened by many instruments, is also reported. Regressions (9) to (12) use instruments in 
levels dated t-4 for the equations in first differences and first-differenced instruments dated t-3 for the equations in levels. These regressions are based on orthogonal deviations. All regressions 
contain industry dummies. Apart from regressions (3), (4), (7), (8), (11) and (12), all regressions include time dummies. 
 OLS in levels Within Groups System GMM 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Ln(Audit feet-1) 0.744 
(0.000) 
0.744 
(0.000) 
0.739 
(0.000) 
0.741 
(0.000) 
0.493 
(0.000) 
0.493 
(0.000) 
0.522 
(0.000) 
0.524 
(0.000) 
0.694 
(0.000) 
0.690 
(0.000) 
0.659 
(0.000) 
0.659 
(0.000) 
Ln(Total assets) 0.142 
(0.000) 
0.140 
(0.000) 
0.142 
(0.000) 
0.142 
(0.000) 
0.261 
(0.000) 
0.262 
(0.000) 
0.270 
(0.000) 
0.269 
(0.000) 
0.175 
(0.000) 
0.173 
(0.000) 
0.191 
(0.000) 
0.191 
(0.000) 
Inventories/Total 
assets 
0.158 
(0.079) 
0.141 
(0.120) 
0.152 
(0.093) 
0.156 
(0.082) 
0.333 
(0.214) 
0.330 
(0.218) 
0.296 
(0.253) 
0.300 
(0.245) 
0.374 
(0.240) 
0.364 
(0.251) 
0.155 
(0.616) 
0.155 
(0.617) 
Receivables/Total 
assets 
0.113 
(0.232) 
0.120 
(0.203) 
0.133 
(0.163) 
0.125 
(0.183) 
0.163 
(0.506) 
0.160 
(0.515) 
0.193 
(0.471) 
0.197 
(0.460) 
-0.034 
(0.894) 
-0.016 
(0.950) 
0.043 
(0.874) 
0.043 
(0.876) 
Proportion of non-
UK subs. 
0.174 
(0.000) 
0.172 
(0.000) 
0.174 
(0.000) 
0.177 
(0.000) 
0.068 
(0.337) 
0.068 
(0.343) 
0.104 
(0.146) 
0.107 
(0.134) 
0.249 
(0.007) 
0.246 
(0.007) 
0.242 
(0.014) 
0.242 
(0.011) 
Proportion of US 
subs. 
0.318 
(0.000) 
0.316 
(0.000) 
0.314 
(0.000) 
0.328 
(0.000) 
0.300 
(0.018) 
0.299 
(0.018) 
0.289 
(0.013) 
0.283 
(0.017) 
0.466 
(0.014) 
0.496 
(0.009) 
0.614 
(0.001) 
0.615 
(0.001) 
Debt/Total assets -0.006 
(0.797) 
-0.006 
(0.783) 
-0.006 
(0.805) 
-0.001 
(0.968) 
0.032 
(0.290) 
0.031 
(0.310) 
0.017 
(0.586) 
0.022 
(0.471) 
0.061 
(0.221) 
0.065 
(0.204) 
0.070 
(0.116) 
0.070 
(0.107) 
ROA -0.001 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.488) 
-0.001 
(0.556) 
-0.001 
(0.142) 
-0.001 
(0.132) 
BiG Four 0.012 
(0.703) 
0.011 
(0.719) 
0.006 
(0.857) 
0.008 
(0.800) 
-0.022 
(0.845) 
-0.019 
(0.866) 
0.011 
(0.920) 
-0.001 
(0.995) 
0.104 
(0.295) 
0.092 
(0.359) 
0.058 
(0.519) 
0.057 
(0.514) 
Big Five -0.126 
(0.004) 
-0.127 
(0.004) 
-0.108 
(0.002) 
-0.101 
(0.003) 
-0.145 
(0.251) 
-0.141 
(0.265) 
-0.174 
(0.103) 
-0.186 
(0.074) 
-0.138 
(0.163) 
-0.148 
(0.136) 
-0.094 
(0.309) 
-0.095 
(0.300) 
London 0.072 
(0.003) 
0.072 
(0.003) 
0.070 
(0.004) 
0.073 
(0.002) 
0.037 
(0.381) 
0.037 
(0.382) 
0.036 
(0.379) 
0.036 
(0.379) 
0.049 
(0.481) 
0.049 
(0.482) 
0.065 
(0.368) 
0.065 
(0.358) 
Ln(Non-audit fee to 
auditor) 
0.040 
(0.000) 
0.039 
(0.000) 
0.040 
(0.000) 
0.041 
(0.000) 
0.038 
(0.000) 
0.038 
(0.000) 
0.034 
(0.000) 
0.034 
(0.000) 
0.027 
(0.078) 
0.027 
(0.081) 
0.044 
(0.008) 
0.044 
(0.006) 
Ln(Non-audit fee to 
other) 
0.005 
(0.374) 
0.004 
(0.456) 
0.004 
(0.467) 
0.004 
(0.419) 
0.000 
(0.998) 
0.000 
(0.983) 
-0.001 
(0.838) 
-0.001 
(0.885) 
0.003 
(0.815) 
0.004 
(0.722) 
-0.007 
(0.549) 
-0.007 
(0.554) 
Cross-listed 0.031 
 (0.058) 
─ ─ ─ -0.027 
(0.488) 
─ ─ ─ 0.079 
(0.235) 
─ ─ ─ 
Exchange-listed ─ 0.060 
(0.008) 
0.040 
(0.121) 
─ ─ -0.049 
(0.473) 
-0.100 
(0.169) 
─ ─ 0.124 
(0.148) 
-0.001 
(0.994) 
─ 
OTC-listed ─ 0.008 
(0.659) 
0.018 
(0.417) 
─ ─ -0.015 
(0.739) 
0.032 
(0.486) 
─ ─ 0.033 
(0.711) 
0.002 
(0.978) 
─ 
Post-SOX effect for 
exchange-listed 
firms 
─ ─ 0.057 
(0.057) 
0.081 
(0.003) 
─ ─ 
0.100 
(0.000) 
0.089 
(0.001) 
─ ─ 0.102 
(0.099) 
0.102 
(0.068) 
Post-SOX effect for 
OTC-listed firms 
─ ─ -0.013 
(0.679) 
-0.005 
(0.846) 
─ ─ -0.012 
(0.754) 
-0.004 
(0.914) 
─ ─ 0.021 
(0.804) 
0.024 
(0.669) 
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Table 3 Cont’d 
 
 OLS in levels Within Groups System GMM 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Constant -0.632 
(0.000) 
-0.613 
(0.000) 
-0.648 
(0.000) 
-0.650 
(0.000) 
-0.751 
(0.053) 
-0.757 
(0.051) 
-0.975 
(0.010) 
-0.973 
(0.010) 
-1.250 
(0.000) 
0.434 
(0.028) 
-1.365 
(0.000) 
-1.363 
(0.000) 
m1 0.57 
(0.568) 
0.52 
(0.602) 
0.63 
(0.530) 
0.62 
(0.534) 
0.47 
(0.000) 
0.43 
(0.000) 
0.44 
(0.000) 
0.43 
(0.000) 
-7.47 
(0.000) 
-7.46 
(0.000) 
-7.33 
(0.000) 
-7.32 
(0.000) 
m2 0.84 
(0.400) 
0.79 
(0.431) 
0.68 
(0.497) 
0.73 
(0.464) 
0.45 
(0.000) 
0.40 
(0.000) 
0.41 
(0.000) 
0.40 
(0.000) 
-0.63 
(0.527) 
-0.57 
(0.568) 
-0.59 
(0.556) 
-0.58 
(0.562) 
Sargan test 
(p-value) 
─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ 353.02 
(0.000) 
352.37 
(0.000) 
392.08 
(0.000) 
392.02 
(0.000) 
Hansen test 
(p-value) 
─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ 183.67 
(0.152) 
186.12 
(0.114) 
191.73 
(0.144) 
196.21 
(0.119) 
No. of observations 1674 1674 1670 1670 1717 1717 1713 1713 1674 1674 1670 1670 
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Appendix 
 
Table A: Definition of variables 
Variable Definition 
Panel A: Financial variables 
 
Total assets The sum of total current assets, long term receivables, investment in unconsolidated subsidiaries, other investments, net 
property plant and equipment and other assets (source: Datastream). 
Inventories/ Total assets Tangible items or merchandise net of advances and obsolescence acquired for either (1) resale directly or (2) included in the 
production of finished goods manufactured for sale in the normal course of operation over total assets (source: Datastream). 
Receivables/ Total assets The amounts due to the company resulting from the sale of goods and services on credit to customers (after applicable 
reserves) over total assets. These amounts should reasonably be expected to be collected within a year or within the normal 
operations (source: Datastream). 
Debt/ Total assets The sum of long and short term debt over total assets (source: Datastream). 
Return on assets (ROA) The net income the company uses to calculate its earnings per share (before extraordinary items) plus interest expense on 
debt (the service charge for the use of capital before the reduction for interest capitalized; if interest expense is reported net 
of interest income, and interest income cannot be found the net figure is shown; it includes but is not restricted to interest 
expense on short term debt, interest expense on long term debt and capitalized lease obligations, amortization expense 
associated with the issuance of debt) over total assets times 100 (source: Datastream). 
Return on equity (ROE) The net income the company uses to calculate its earnings per share (before extraordinary items) over common equity times 
100 (source: Datastream). 
Number of subsidiaries 
 
The total number of subsidiaries listed in the annual report (source: annual report). 
Number of non-UK 
subsidiaries 
 
The total number of subsidiaries incorporated and operating overseas (source: annual report). 
Number of US 
subsidiaries 
 
The total number of subsidiaries incorporated and operating in the US (source: annual report). 
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Table A Cont’d 
Variable Definition 
Panel B: Audit variables 
 
Audit fee The total fee paid for the statutory audit of the company and its subsidiaries. Where more than one auditor is involved the 
combined audit fee is used (source: annual report). 
Non-audit fee to auditor The total amount paid to the company’s auditor for non-audit services. Where figures for non-audit services in the UK and 
overseas are separately mentioned the figures are combined in calculating this variable. In instances where companies 
mention the payment of additional non-audit fees to auditors, which are capitalised, we also include these in calculating this 
variable (source: annual report).  
Non-audit fee to other The total amount paid to accounting firms other than the auditor for the provision of non-audit services (source: annual 
report). 
 
Big Four Time-varying indicator variable equal to one if during 2002 to 2008 the audit is performed by one of the following accounting 
firms: Deloitte and Touche, Ernst and Young, KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers, and zero otherwise (source: annual 
report). 
 
Big Five Time-varying indicator variable equal to one if during 1999 to 2001 the audit is performed by one of the following accounting 
firms: Arthur Andersen, Deloitte and Touche, Ernst and Young, KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers, and zero otherwise 
(source: annual report). 
 
London Time-varying indicator variable equal to one if the auditor is located in London and zero otherwise (source: annual report). 
 
Panel C: Cross-listing dummies 
 
Cross-listed Time-varying indicator variable equal to one if the firm is cross-listed in the US during a specific year and zero otherwise 
(source: stock exchanges and Bank of New York). 
Exchange-listed Time-varying indicator variable equal to one if the firm is cross-listed on a US exchange during a specific year and zero 
otherwise (source: stock exchanges and Bank of New York). 
OTC-listed Time-varying indicator variable equal to one if the firm is cross-listed on the US over-the-counter market (OTC) during a 
specific year and zero otherwise (source: stock exchanges and Bank of New York). 
Post-SOX effect for 
exchange-listed firms 
Time-varying indicator variable equal to one during post-SOX period for exchange-listed firms 
Post-SOX effect for OTC-
listed firms 
Time-varying indicator variable equal to one during post-SOX period for OTC-listed firms 
 
 
